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Suppose that a new Christian church in town announced that it will have a special focus on the biblical story of Jesus turning water into wine. Accordingly, rather than 
the single sip of wine commonly consumed at other Christian 
services, worshippers at the new church drink several glasses of 
wine as part of the service, in imitation of the wedding guests 
at Cana.
Unfortunately, after church, the drunken worshipers spill 
into the streets and are generally a loud and raucous group. 
Neighbors complain about being woken up early by their 
noise. Drunk driving arrests, previously unheard of on Sunday 
mornings, begin to rise.  
In an eff ort to eliminate the noise, traffi  c, and other 
problems caused by the churchgoers, the town outlaws the 
consumption of alcohol on Sunday mornings. Th e law is neutral 
and generally applicable—it outlaws all consumption, and 
applies to all drinkers, religious or not. Th e law is not passed 
out of any animus toward the new church, but rather as a good 
faith attempt to protect the rest of the population from the 
impact of the drunken faithful.
Th is hypothetical highlights an important blind spot in 
the way most courts approach Free Exercise cases. Does the 
Free Exercise Clause extend to situations where the legislature 
deliberately targets a religious practice, but does so for neutral 
reasons and is willing to extend the ban to people who happen 
to engage in the same practice for non-religious reasons? While 
one can imagine reasonable arguments on both sides about the 
constitutionality of the Sunday morning alcohol ban, it seems 
absurd to say that the Free Exercise Clause is not part of the 
equation. Yet under the First Amendment analysis presently 
employed by many courts, that result is entirely likely.
I. Two Types of Free Exercise Cases
Since the Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Employment 
Division v. Smith,1 virtually all free exercise cases have been 
grouped into one of two categories. On one hand is the rare 
case where a law treats religious conduct more harshly than if 
the same conduct were engaged in for non-religious purposes. 
For example, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah, the Court invalidated a law that outlawed ritual animal 
sacrifi ces because “certain religions” may propose to engage in 
such practices.2 Th e law also included a series of exemptions 
making clear that the only animal killings addressed would be 
the ritual sacrifi ces conducted as part of the Santeria religion.3 
Th e Court found that such religious discrimination in the 
text or operation of a statute is subjected to strict scrutiny and 
therefore only permitted when narrowly tailored to a compelling 
state interest.4 Accordingly, such outright discrimination against 
religion is virtually never permissible; as Justice Souter observed 
at the time, it is also exceedingly rare.5  
On the other hand are laws that do not make express 
religious distinctions in their terms or operation.6 For example, 
the ban on use of peyote at issue in Smith outlawed all peyote 
use, whether engaged in for religious reasons or not. Such 
“neutral and generally applicable” laws are not subject to free 
exercise analysis at all, and instead are permissible unless they 
violate some other constitutional principle.7
When viewed through the Smith/Lukumi dichotomy, the 
Free Exercise Clause appears to retain relevance only in the rare 
cases where the law treats religious conduct worse than the same 
conduct engaged in for secular reasons. Accordingly, except for 
rare cases of clear religious discrimination or animus, virtually 
all laws challenged on federal free exercise grounds are found 
to be “neutral and generally applicable,” and therefore exempt 
from free exercise analysis under Smith.8   
II. Targeted Laws of General Applicability
A third possibility exists. A legislature seeking to outlaw 
a particular religious conduct—perhaps for perfectly neutral 
reasons—may enact a law that is designed to target that religious 
conduct, but is nevertheless facially neutral and generally 
applicable.  
In some cases, this targeting of religious conduct may 
be the result of animus—the lawmakers want to eliminate 
the religious conduct because it is religious. Courts generally 
appear able to address this type of targeting under Lukumi, 
particularly where the lawmakers are open about their anti-
religion motivation.9  
In many other cases, however, the targeting will occur 
without any particular animus toward religion at all. Th at is, 
the targeting of the religious conduct will occur not because 
of the religious nature of the conduct, but for some other 
reason (such as public safety). Th ese laws still clearly target 
religious conduct—indeed, their very goal is to eliminate that 
conduct—but will usually apply whether the conduct is engaged 
in for religious reasons or any other reason.  
Th e Sunday morning alcohol ban described above is this 
type of targeted law of general applicability. Th e law plainly 
targets religious conduct—its very purpose is to rein in the 
drunken faithful from the new church—but it is nevertheless 
neutral (i.e., the legislature was not restricting the drinking 
because it was religious, but because it caused other problems) 
and generally applicable (i.e., it applied to other drinkers as 
well, not just those from the new church).  
To further illustrate this type of targeting, suppose a town 
has an infl ux of Orthodox Jewish and Seventh Day Adventist 
business owners who, for religious reasons, keep their shops 
closed on Saturdays. Many shoppers stop coming downtown 
on Saturdays, because so many businesses are closed. Citing the 
harm to the entire downtown business community from the 
Saturday closings, the town council enacts a law requiring all 
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businesses to remain open on Saturdays. Th e law is passed for 
economic reasons, and not out of animus toward religion. Th e 
law is also generally applicable—although it was designed to 
address the Saturday closings caused by religious conduct, it also 
would prohibit Saturday closings for non-religious reasons. 
Th e Saturday opening law is a targeted law of general 
applicability. It is targeted, because religious conduct was causing 
a particular problem (harm to the downtown economy) and 
the object of the law was to address that harm by stopping the 
religious conduct. Yet the law is also neutral (i.e., there is no 
evidence of animus and the closings are not targeted because of 
religion but for other reasons) and generally applicable, in that 
it would apply to the same problematic conduct if it happened 
to be engaged in for reasons other than religion (for example, 
if the owner is on vacation). 
Th e Saturday opening law can be contrasted with the law 
at issue in Smith. In Smith, the challenged law was a general 
ban on drug use.10 While the law had an incidental eff ect on 
religious users of peyote, the primary purpose of the drug ban 
was not to eliminate the religious use of peyote, but, presumably, 
to promote public safety. Smith would have involved targeting 
if the legislature had passed the drug law because of problems it 
had with religious uses of peyote. In contrast, while the Saturday 
opening law was not the result of religious animus and would 
apply generally, it was enacted in response to religious conduct, 
and its main goal is to eliminate that conduct.
Th is type of targeting of religious conduct is, of course, 
as burdensome on the religious actors as if the legislature had 
said “we want to get rid of the religious store owners, so let’s 
make them keep their stores open on Saturdays.” In either case, 
the lawmaker has identifi ed religious conduct as problematic 
and set out to prohibit that conduct in a way that will force the 
store owners to either violate their beliefs or lose their stores. 
Yet, if the legislature betrays no animus, and if the legislature 
is willing to ban the same conduct in the rare situation where 
it occurs without religious motivation, courts generally excuse 
this type of targeting of religious conduct from free exercise 
analysis entirely.  
If recent cases are any guide, the Saturday opening law 
would be analyzed by most courts as follows. First, the court 
would determine that, unlike the law at issue in Lukumi, the 
Saturday opening law is neutral. Th e court would analyze 
whether the text contains any indicators that it is designed 
to restrict only religiously motivated conduct, or to restrict 
that conduct because of the religious motivation. Courts 
would also look at the operation of the statute to make sure 
that, in operation, the law does not treat religious conduct 
diff erently from the same conduct engaged in for non-religious 
purposes.11 
In determining neutrality, some courts would stop with 
the text and operation of the law, perhaps mindful of Justice 
Scalia’s argument in his Lukumi concurrence that “it is virtually 
impossible to determine the singular ‘motive’ of a collective 
legislative body.”12 Th ese courts would deem the law neutral and, 
if also generally applicable to non-religious closings, exempt 
from Free Exercise analysis under Smith.13  
Most courts, however, would look into the law’s history 
for any evidence of bad intent, namely that the law targeted 
the Saturday closings because of their religious motivation.14 
Finding a neutral reason for the law—namely protection of the 
downtown economy—the courts would likely deem the law 
“neutral and generally applicable,” and therefore constitutional 
under Smith.15 Most courts would not consider the fact that 
the law is targeted, in that the entire point of the law was to 
address a problem caused by religious conduct by prohibiting 
that conduct. 
III. Example:  Th e Ninth Circuit’s Plan B Decision
Th e Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Stormans, Inc. v. 
Selecky provides a clear example of lawmakers targeting religious 
conduct through the use of generally applicable laws, and a 
court failing to even apply the Free Exercise Clause to analyze 
the challenged law.16
Stormans concerned a Washington Board of Pharmacy 
regulation adopted in response to certain pharmacists 
refusing to dispense a drug known as Plan B.17 Plan B is often 
referred to as the “morning after pill” or as an “emergency 
contraceptive” because it can be taken after sexual intercourse 
to prevent pregnancy.18 Both the drug’s manufacturer and 
the FDA acknowledge that Plan B can work by preventing 
an already-fertilized egg from implanting in the uterus.19 For 
this reason, some pharmacists object on religious grounds to 
selling or dispensing Plan B, because they believe they would be 
participating in terminating an already-started human life.20
In 2005, the state Pharmacy Board began getting calls 
asking its position about pharmacies and pharmacists who 
refused on religious grounds to sell Plan B.21 Th e Board convened 
meetings with Washington State Pharmacy Association, Planned 
Parenthood and other interested parties to discuss whether and 
under what circumstances a pharmacist should be permitted to 
refuse to fi ll a prescription on religious grounds.22 Ultimately, 
the Board adopted a draft rule that allowed a pharmacist 
to refuse to dispense a medication for religious reasons, but 
required that no pharmacist or pharmacy obstruct a patient’s 
eff ort to obtain lawfully prescribed drugs.23  
The immediate reaction to the Board’s draft rule 
confi rmed that the focus was on religious refusals. Th e same 
day, Washington’s Governor Christine Gregoire sent a letter 
to the Chairman of the Pharmacy Board “stating her strong 
opposition to the draft rule.”24 Th e Governor emphasized 
that “no one should be denied appropriate prescription 
drugs based on the personal, religious or moral objection of 
individual pharmacists.”25 In a related press conference, the 
Governor stated that she could remove the entire Board with 
the legislature’s consent but “she would prefer not to take such 
a drastic step.”26 Th e Governor then sent the Board a diff erent 
draft rule, which required all pharmacies to dispense all lawfully 
prescribed drugs, and prevented pharmacists from refusing to 
dispense for religious reasons.27 Perhaps not surprisingly, the 
Governor’s statement prompted a change of heart, and the 
Board voted unanimously in favor of the Governor’s proposal.28 
Th e Board then enacted a rule requiring pharmacies to dispense 
all prescribed medications, regardless of religious objections, and 
essentially requiring double staffi  ng if any pharmacy wished to 
accommodate a pharmacist’s religious objections.29
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Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff  pharmacy and pharmacists 
fi led suit, arguing that the rule violated, inter alia, the federal 
Free Exercise Clause.30 Th e pharmacy, asserting the free exercise 
rights of its owners, alleged that forcing it to sell Plan B would 
force its owners to choose between violating the law and 
violating their religion.31 Th e pharmacists alleged that they 
were forced to take lower paying, less desirable jobs as a result 
of the State’s requirement.32
Th e district court found that, although the law purported 
to apply to refusals to sell any drug for any reason—i.e., 
it appeared to be generally applicable—“[f ]rom the very 
beginning of this issue, the focus of the debate [was] on Plan B 
and on religious objection to dispensing that drug.”33 Th e court 
found that the “overriding objective of the subject regulations 
was, to the degree possible, to eliminate moral and religious 
objections from the business of dispensing medication.”34 Under 
Lukumi, the court found that plaintiff s were likely to succeed 
on the merits of their Free Exercise challenge, and entered a 
preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Rule.35
Defendants appealed and last month the Ninth Circuit 
reversed. Th e majority held that, in deciding whether a law 
is subject to free exercise analysis, it would not consider “the 
legislative history of the law—its historical background, 
the events leading up to its adoption, and its legislative or 
administrative history, including contemporaneous statements 
made by members of the decisionmaking body.”36 Instead, 
looking solely at the text of the rule, the court concluded that 
it was neutral and generally applicable, because it applied to 
refusals to sell drugs other than Plan B, and because it would 
restrict even refusals to sell Plan B for reasons other than 
religious objection.37 Accordingly, despite evidence that the 
entire point of the rule was to address refusals to sell Plan B 
on religious grounds, the Court found that the Free Exercise 
Clause did not even apply under Smith.38
Th e Ninth Circuit’s decision is surely wrong on the issue 
of whether the history of the law can be considered in the 
Smith analysis. Th ere is some agreement among the circuit 
courts that the Smith/Lukumi analysis requires consideration 
of these facts.39 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself appears to 
consider such facts both in the free exercise context and in its 
Establishment Clause cases.40 
Th e Ninth Circuit’s refusal to look at the context of the 
law forced it to miss what should have been an obvious example 
of targeting. Th ere seems to be little doubt that the focus of the 
entire rulemaking process was on religious objections to selling 
Plan B and how to solve the alleged problems caused by such 
religious objections.41 Indeed, the very press release announcing 
the rules acknowledged they were “sparked by complaints that 
some pharmacists and pharmacies refused to fi ll prescriptions 
for emergency contraceptives—also known as morning after 
pills or Plan B.”42
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit permitted the rule to 
completely avoid free exercise analysis because the rule was 
generally applicable.  
Had the Ninth Circuit considered the context of the rule, 
it would have seen clear evidence that the law targeted religious 
conduct, and that its “general applicability” was extremely 
dubious. In fact, over the twelve years preceding the rule, there 
was no evidence of any problem with refusals to sell any drug 
other than Plan B.43 Th us the rulemakers essentially banned 
something—refusals to sell drugs other than Plan B—that rarely 
or never happened. And in exchange for regulating something 
that rarely or never happened, the lawmakers were able to 
directly target and outlaw the religious behavior to which they 
objected—religious refusals to sell Plan B—and avoid free 
exercise analysis entirely.
IV. Smith and the Proper Analysis of Targeted Laws
As the Stormans case demonstrates, an over-reading of 
the Smith decision can lead courts to fail to even apply the Free 
Exercise Clause in the cases for which it is most appropriate, 
namely, when lawmakers deliberately set out to prohibit 
religious conduct. A proper reading of Smith, however, requires 
application of strict scrutiny in such cases.
First, the shorthand version of Smith commonly used by 
courts—that “neutral and generally applicable” laws are immune 
from free exercise attack—is incorrect, or at least incomplete. 
Smith involved an Oregon law prohibiting possession of certain 
controlled substances, including peyote.44 Th e plaintiff s were 
dismissed from their jobs at a private drug rehabilitation center 
when they admitted to having used peyote in sacramental 
ceremonies at their Native American Church.45 Plaintiff s were 
then denied unemployment benefi ts because they were found 
to be ineligible for having engaged in work-related misconduct 
for violating the controlled substance law.46  
Oregon’s controlled substances law was clearly not targeted 
at religious conduct. When enacted, the law had absolutely 
nothing to do with religion or religious objectors, but was 
presumably focused on general public safety. As the Court 
made clear, it was not “specifi cally directed” at the plaintiff s.47 
Moreover, the law’s impact in outlawing certain religious 
conduct was not its central purpose. Th e legislature did not 
fi rst determine that the religious use of peyote was causing 
problems and then pass a general law to address that problem. 
Rather the restriction on religious use of peyote was “merely 
the incidental eff ect of a generally applicable and otherwise 
valid provision.”48
Th us, the Smith opinion should not be read to lower 
the level of scrutiny for laws that target a particular religious 
conduct. Unlike the law at issue in Smith, a targeted law would 
be “specifi cally directed” at religious conduct, and would restrict 
that conduct as the direct or purposeful eff ect of the law, rather 
than an “incidental” one.49 Th is is true in the rare case of a 
legislature that acts out of true religious animus, as well as in 
the more common situation in which the lawmakers simply 
wish to eliminate the religious conduct for some reason that 
has nothing to do with religion, as in our hypothetical Saturday 
openings law or the Sunday morning alcohol ban. Accordingly, 
Smith should not be read to excuse such targeted laws from free 
exercise analysis. To the contrary, Smith’s emphasis on the lack 
of targeting, and on the incidental nature of the burden to a 
wholly unrelated purpose, makes clear that targeted laws should 
still receive strict scrutiny.
Even if Smith had left open the question of targeted but 
generally applicable laws, common sense requires that such 
laws be subject to scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause. 
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In a pluralistic society, “free exercise”—i.e., that which the 
Free Exercise Clause is intended to protect—necessarily 
means diff erent things to diff erent people. While a Catholic’s 
free exercise may include attendance at Sunday Mass and 
consumption of sacramental wine, a Santerian’s may include 
animal sacrifi ce, a Native American’s may include use of peyote, 
and a Jew’s may include observing a Saturday Sabbath. In this 
respect, the free exercise of religion is actually particularly 
susceptible to targeting through laws of general applicability—
members of other religions will be largely unaff ected by a 
“general” ban on animal sacrifi ce or consumption of wine before 
noon on Sundays. Th us where lawmakers are clearly targeting 
particular religious conduct, they should not escape all First 
Amendment scrutiny simply by using a generally applicable 
rule to do it.  
A law that deliberately targets religious conduct should 
also be subject to scrutiny because, by defi nition, the asserted 
government interests were presumably not strong enough to 
have previously resulted in a general law. In Smith, for example, 
one cannot doubt the legitimacy of the state’s asserted interest 
in regulating hallucinogenic drugs. Th e state had asserted that 
interest, and passed laws to further that interest, having nothing 
to do with the plaintiff s’ religious use of peyote. Smith may well 
have had a diff erent outcome if that law had been “specifi cally 
directed” at stopping Native American religious use of peyote as 
its direct and not “incidental” eff ect, even if the legislature had 
been willing to ban non-religious uses in the process as well.
Likewise, in Stormans, despite the well-known facts that 
no pharmacy can stock all drugs, and that pharmacies from 
time to time will not be able to fi ll a particular prescription, 
Washington did not seek to mandate fi lling of prescriptions 
until it was responding to religious refusals to dispense Plan B. 
Courts should heavily scrutinize the arguments of lawmakers 
who had never before regulated a particular behavior, but 
who, when presented with religious exercise of that behavior, 
suddenly assert that neutral reasons are suffi  cient to foreclose 
free exercise. Not all such cases will lead to invalidation—there 
may be compelling interests at stake that, for some reason, were 
never previously recognized—but it makes no sense to say that 
free exercise analysis should not even be applied.
Finally, strict scrutiny is appropriate precisely because in 
many targeting cases the legislature will not be acting out of 
anti-religious animus, but will simply be engaging in ordinary 
political balancing. Th e fundamental point of the Free Exercise 
Clause is that religion is not supposed to be merely equivalent 
to all other interests that a lawmaking body balances, but merits 
special protection. If and when a lawmaking body considers 
religiously motivated conduct and then decides that other 
factors are of suffi  cient importance to outlaw that conduct, it 
would seem particularly odd for the Free Exercise Clause to 
be totally inapplicable simply because the end result of that 
balancing process is a generally applicable law.  
V. Conclusion
One negative eff ect of the Smith decision is that lawmakers 
(and some courts) read that decision to expressly authorize the 
deliberate targeting and criminalization of religiously motivated 
conduct, so long as the targeting is achieved by a facially neutral 
and generally applicable law, and as long as the legislature can 
off er neutral reasons for opposing the conduct. In this sense, 
Smith has created the roadmap for legislatures that wish to 
prohibit a particular religious activity and avoid constitutional 
scrutiny. As the Stormans case indicates, when given a roadmap 
on how to achieve policy goals while avoiding constitutional 
scrutiny, at least some lawmakers will follow the map.50  
Th e Smith decision has long been subject to intense 
criticism, with critics arguing that it left the Free Exercise Clause 
essentially a dead letter.51 Even if the Court is loath to reconsider 
Smith, the Stormans case presents an ideal opportunity for the 
Court to confi rm that Smith is not a roadmap for lawmakers 
to regulate religious conduct. Rather, the Court can make clear 
that Smith was simply addressing how courts should analyze 
pre-existing, generally applicable laws that were not enacted 
to prohibit religious conduct, and that laws that specifi cally 
target religious conduct—regardless of the motives of the 
legislature—are still within reach of the Free Exercise Clause.  
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Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1226 (11th Cir. 
2004) (“Although the legislative history of a statute is relevant to the process 
of statutory interpretation, we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a 
statutory text that is clear.”). But see St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City 
of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 633 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e do not run the risk 
of selective use of statements in legislative history that might not refl ect the 
intent of the legislature.”).
40  See, e.g., McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 
U.S. 844, 862 (2005) (Establishment Clause); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 
725 (2004) (“[W]e fi nd neither in the history or text of Article I, § 11, of the 
Washington Constitution, nor in the operation of the Promise Scholarship 
Program, anything that suggests animus toward religion.”); Santa Fe Ind. Sch. 
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (Establishment Clause).
41  See, e.g., Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1259 (W.D. 
Wash. 2007) (quoting letter from Washington State Human Rights Council 
stating that “the drug at the center of this issue is Plan B.”).
42  Id. 
43  Id. at 1261 (“A review of complaints referred to the Board from 1995 to 
2007 does not indicate a problem with access to HIV-related medications, or 
any other medications for that matter.”). 
44  Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
45  Id. 
46  Id.
47  Id. at 878 (“Th ey contend that their religious motivation for using peyote 
places them beyond the reach of a criminal law that is not specifi cally directed 
at their religious practice.”).
48  Id.
49  See, e.g., McTernan v. City Of York, 564 F.3d 636, 647 (3rd Cir. 2009) 
(citing Smith and Lukumi); Cornerstone Christian Schools v. University 
Interscholastic League, 563 F.3d 127, 135 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Smith and 
Lukumi); Colorado Christian University v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1257 
(10th Cir. 2008) (citing Smith).
50  A similar problem occurs in the free speech context, where cases such 
as Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989), and Clark v. 
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984), established that 
legislatures could abridge free speech rights so long as they did so through 
content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations. Given this roadmap, 
legislatures have shown considerable creativity in regulating very particular 
speech through time, place, and manner regulations. Th e city of Seattle, for 
example, wished to regulate protesters at the 1999 World Trade Organization 
conference. Rather than proceed by injunction (which would have faced 
heightened scrutiny under Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 521 U.S. 
753 (1994)) or by a law that specifi cally identifi ed the WTO protests as 
the problem, Seattle instead proceeded by a mayoral emergency order that 
outlawed all speakers for the exact time and location of the WTO conference. 
Because, in theory, protesters might have shown up at that exact time and 
location to talk about other issues, the order was treated as neutral by the 
courts. See Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005). 
Even more egregiously, Massachusetts has used the “time, place, and 
manner” test to create a law that obviously targets abortion protesters without, 
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so far, facing strict scrutiny. Massachusetts has enacted a statute banning 
speech only (a) within 35 feet of an abortion clinic, and (b) while the clinic 
is open. Because these restrictions technically relate to the “place” and the 
“time” of the speech and because in theory someone could show up at an 
abortion clinic to protest about issues other than abortion, courts have, quite 
remarkably, deemed the law neutral. See McCullen v. Coakley, 571 F.3d 167 
(1st Cir. 2009).   
As in the Free Exercise context, these legislatures are taking a test 
announced by the Court when it was evaluating a non-targeted law—i.e., 
a law that was passed with no intention of regulating a specifi c group of 
speakers or religious observers—and using that test as a roadmap for how to 
target disfavored speakers or conduct while avoiding constitutional scrutiny.   
51  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 577 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (“‘Neutral, generally applicable’ 
laws, drafted as they are from the perspective of the non-adherent, have the 
unavoidable potential of putting the believer to a choice between God and 
government.”); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the 
Smith Decision, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109, 1153 (1990) (“Religious exercise is 
no longer to be treated as a preferred freedom; so long as it is treated no worse 
than commercial or other secular activity, religion can ask no more.”).
